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Introduction
In 1832, South Carolina’s famous nullification ordinance declared
that the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void within the
boundaries of that state. 1 The ordinance, which built on a strong
theory of state sovereignty advanced by John C. Calhoun, did not
exactly prosper. President Andrew Jackson—like Calhoun, born in
South Carolina—rejected nullification in principle, threatened to
enforce the tariff by force, then undercut the state’s practical position
by introducing new legislation to radically lower that same tariff. 2 No
other state joined South Carolina’s protest, and, in fact, eight
Southern state legislatures passed resolutions condemning the South
Carolinians’ action.3 And if that denouement did not suffice to settle
the question of whether a state may defy a valid federal law, well,
there was also the “late unpleasantness” of 1861–65.4
Fast-forward, however, to November 2012, when the states of
Colorado and Washington both voted to legalize recreational
marijuana use—also in contravention of federal law and policy.5 These
states joined the District of Columbia and twenty other states that
have legalized the drug for medicinal purposes. 6 California and
1.

See South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, Nov. 24, 1832, available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp.

2.

See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The
Transformation of America, 1815–1848, at 395–410 (2007)
(describing South Carolina’s nullification motive and plan, and
President Jackson’s response); Richard E. Ellis, The Union at
Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights, and the
Nullification Crisis (1987) 41–73 (detailing Jackson’s and Calhoun’s
fight over nullification).

3.

HOWE, supra note 2, at 406–07.

4.

Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691, 693 n.4 (2004) (asserting that
the legality of secession had been settled in the case of “Grant v. Lee”).

5.

See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal
Questions Remain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15.

6.

See Alaska Stat. § 17.37.030 (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2811
(2012); Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007);
Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-408a
(West 2014); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4903A (Supp. 2014); D.C.
Code § 7-1671.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329122(2013); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 130/25 (West Supp. 2014);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2423-A (Supp. 2014); Md. Code
Ann., Health–Gen. § 13-3313 (West Supp. 2014); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 94C App., § 1-4 (West Supp. 2014); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 333.26424 (West Supp. 2014); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 152.32 (West Supp. 2014); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-319 (2013);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453A.200 (Lexis-Nexis 2009); N.H. Rev.
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Colorado—pioneers in legalizing medical and recreational marijuana
use, respectively—have fared better than did South Carolina in the
1830s. Other states have followed their lead, prompting a national
debate about marijuana use. Even the District of Columbia—a federal
enclave governed by “federal” law—has defied Congress by legalizing
recreational use. 7 And President Obama—rather than reprising
Andrew Jackson’s threat to “hang the first man of them [nullifiers
resisting federal authority] I can get my hands on to the first tree I
can find”8—has instructed his Departments of Justice and Treasury to
accommodate these state departures from federal norms.9

Stat. Ann. § 126-X:2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 24:6I-6 (West Supp. 2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-2 (West
2013); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.319 (West 2003); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 21-28.6-4 (2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4474b (2013); Wash.
Rev. Code § 69.51A.040 (2013); see generally Robert A. Mikos,
Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 5, 5 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption] (surveying
developments in marijuana legalization).
7.

See Melanie Eversley, D.C. Marijuana Decriminalization Law Takes Effect, USA Today (July 17, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2014/07/17/dc-marijuana-law/12770301/ (noting the conflict with federal law).

8.

HOWE, supra note 2, at 406 (quoting 2 Augustus C. Buell, History
of Andrew Jackson 244–45 (1904)).

9.

See Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the
Treasury, FIN-2014-G001, Guidance:
BSA
Expectations
Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (2014); Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
All United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related
Financial
Crimes
(Feb.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/legacy/2014/02
/14/DAG%20Memo%20-%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20
Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2014%20%282%29.pdf;
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to All United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov
/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; Memorandum from
James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June
29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.
pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y General, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Selected United States Att’ys, Investigations and
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct.
19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/
legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
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Across a range of issues—including, for example, health insurance,10 experimental medicines,11 gun control,12 sports gambling,13 and
immigration14—states are acting contrary to federal law policy. Unlike
South Carolina’s infamous ordinance, most of these instances of
modern-day nullification may well be legal. They generally do not
purport to alter the binding force of federal law, but they rely on the
likelihood that, as a practical matter, federal authorities cannot
enforce national law without the cooperation of state officials.15 The
history of marijuana legalization over the past decades suggests that,
at least on some issues, contemporary nullification is a winning
strategy.
This Article asks what modern-day nullification can tell us about
the health and structure of contemporary federalism. Contemporary
resistance to federal law is made possible by the structure of cooper-

10.

The Advisory Bd. Co., Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion,
Daily Briefing (Feb. 11, 2015), www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/
resources/primers/medicaidmap (noting that nineteen states have
rejected the Affordable Care Act’s invitation to expand Medicaid).

11.

See Kimberly Leonard, Seeking the Right to Try, U.S. News & World
Rep. (Nov. 18, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/art
icles/2014/11/18/right-to-try-laws-allowing-patients-to-try-experimentaldrugs-bypass-fda (noting that five states have passed “right to try” laws
that “allow terminally ill patients access to drugs that have not been
approved by the [federal] government”).

12.

See Justine McDaniel, Robby Korth & Jessica Boehm, In States, a
Legislative Rush to Nullify Federal Gun Laws, WASH. POST BLOG (Aug.
30, 2014, 1:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp
/2014/08/29/in-states-a-legislative-rush-to-nullify-federal-gun-laws/
(noting that eleven states have passed laws purporting to forbid enforcement of federal gun laws in the state).

13.

See James Surowiecki, A Call to Action, NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/a-call-to-action
(noting that New Jersey has legalized sports gambling despite its
continuing illegality under federal law).

14.

See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)
(upholding Arizona law enforcing restrictions on employment of undocumented aliens more strictly than under federal policy).

15.

See generally Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime,
62 VAND. L. REV. 1419 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, Limits of Supremacy]
(exploring the often ignored ability of states to permit conduct otherwise prohibited by Congress). The gun control nullification laws—which
have a similar structure to South Carolina’s nineteenth-century ordinance—appear to be an exception. And federal authorities may be
willing to contest state defiance in areas other than marijuana enforcement. The Justice Department has sued New Jersey, for example, to
contest New Jersey’s action on sports betting. See Surowiecki, supra
note 13.
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ative federalism, under which federal and state authorities share overlapping regulatory jurisdiction and state officials frequently participate in the implementation and enforcement of federal regulatory
schemes.16 This interdependent relationship gives rise to what Heather
Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have called the “power of the servant”: because federal authorities depend on state officials to enforce
federal law, state officials have opportunities to influence the shape of
federal regulation and, sometimes, to resist aspects of federal policy
that they do not like.17 Modern-day nullification goes beyond the “uncooperative federalism” described by Professors Gerken and BulmanPozen, however; rather than subverting federal marijuana policy by
nibbling around the edges, Colorado and Washington have gone on
strike. And as the marijuana controversy illustrates, state officials derive the power to defy federal policy from the fact that they are not
servants, but rather officers of a different government with an independent base of legitimacy and accountability.
It is hard to know how far contemporary state officials will go to
defy federal policy. Certainly the circumstances of contemporary debate about marijuana legalization are particularly auspicious—
marijuana enforcement is a low priority at best for federal officials,
national public opinion favors legalization, and the national Executive
is both sympathetic to legalization and fond of not enforcing federal
laws with which it disagrees. Some of these circumstances may well
prove ephemeral even as to marijuana, and several will not translate
well to other issues on which states wish to depart from federal
norms. Modern-day nullification may have important advantages,
however, including not only the traditional benefits of federalist policy
diversity but also the potential to defuse important and intractable
problems of separation of powers at the national level. Rather than
viewing modern-day nullification as yet another obstacle to federal
policy to be overcome, Congress may wish to consider institutionalizing aspects of state power to depart from federal policy.

16.

See Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of
Government in the United States 4 (Daniel J. Elazar ed. 1966)
(observing that, in modern America, “virtually all governments are
involved in virtually all functions. . . . [T]here is hardly any activity
that does not involve the federal, state, and some local government in
important responsibilities”); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 665
(2001) (“[C]ooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory
authority between the federal government and the states that allows
states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law.”).

17.

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1264 (2009).
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I.

Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Legalization

Federal law classifies marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug18 under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA),19 based on a finding that it has no
accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.20 The CSA thus
categorically prohibits the manufacture, distribution, and possession
of marijuana.21 And the federal prohibition has been upheld against
both charges that it exceeds Congress’s commerce power and claims
that, for medical patients at least, it contravenes a fundamental right
of access to pain relief.22 Although some of us still think the Court
erred in upholding the CSA as applied to personal possession and consumption of marijuana for medicinal purposes, in the absence of any
commercial transaction or movement across state lines,23 that ship has
sailed. The federal marijuana ban is thus “the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”24
Except that in Boulder, Colorado, it is easier to find a head shop
than a coffee shop.25 The reason has to do with the cooperative federalism structure of criminal law enforcement. Generally speaking,
federal and state governments not only share constitutional jurisdiction over drug crimes, but they have also criminalized largely the
same behavior. As a practical matter, however, federal authorities
play a decidedly secondary role. The overall ratio of federal to state
and local law enforcement personnel in this country is roughly one to
ten,26 and drug enforcement is not the priority it once was. In 2007,
18.

21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2014).

19.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–971 (2012)).

20.

See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012).

21.

See id. §§ 841, 844.

22.

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Commerce Clause); Raich v.
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (substantive due
process).

23.

See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the
Federalist Revival after Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.

24.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

25.

Or at least so it was reported by a notable federalism scholar who went
out looking for the latter (so she says) but found only the former at a
recent conference at the University of Colorado.

26.

See Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Census of
State & Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2000 1 (2002); Brian
A. Reaves & Lynn M. Bauer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of
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federal agents made 7,276 marijuana arrests—less than 1 percent of
all American marijuana arrests that year.27 Hence, as Robert Mikos
has observed, “[t]he federal government has too few law enforcement
agents to handle the large number of potential targets. Simply put,
the expected sanctions for using or supplying marijuana under federal
law are too low, standing alone, to deter many prospective marijuana
users or suppliers.”28
Federal marijuana policy thus depends heavily on state and local
enforcement. In this sense, drug policy parallels any number of other
federal regulatory regimes—from environmental policy to Medicaid—
in which state officials play a critical role in implementing federal
policy. Drug enforcement differs from these other cooperative federalism regimes in that state officials are not implementing the federal
drug laws but rather enforcing parallel state prohibitions. But drug
enforcement involves not only overlapping substantive offenses but
also coordinated investigation and prosecution strategies; federal prosecutors tend to focus on major distribution “kingpins,” for example,29
while state and local officials prosecute the overwhelming majority of
minor drug offenses. Hence, the “War on Drugs” amounts to a cooperative federalism regime not all that different, say, from state implementation of the Clean Air Act.
One critical difference between the actions of states “legalizing”
marijuana in defiance of federal policy and South Carolina’s nullification ordinance in 1832 is the purported effect on the relevant
federal rights and obligations. For John C. Calhoun and the South
Carolina legislature, nullification rested on a judgment that the
federal tariff was unconstitutional.30 Nullifiers thus did not so much

Justice Statistics Bulletin: Federal Law Enforcement
Officers, 2002 1 (2003); see also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism,
Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 665,
665 (2002) (“The federal government has never employed a sizable fraction of the nation’s law enforcement officers or prosecutors, nor housed a
large portion of its prisoners.”).
27.

See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1464.

28.

Id. at 1463. As the husband of a federal prosecutor, however, I must
note that federal enforcement policy seems to be different with respect
to marijuana use on federal lands—such as national parks, forests, and
seashores. At least in North Carolina, marijuana crimes continue to be
pursued when they occur in these federal enclaves, even though the Feds
might be unlikely to prosecute such crimes where the state has primary
jurisdiction. Be careful where you light up!

29.

See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1465 (detailing how
federal enforcement targets suppliers rather than minor offenders).

30.

The argument was that Congress was empowered to impose tariffs only
for the purpose of raising revenue and that the tariffs in question had
been levied to protect Northern industries rather than raise revenue.
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deny the supremacy of valid federal laws but rather the exclusivity of
federal judicial review as a mechanism for determining those laws’
constitutional validity. 31 States that have legalized marijuana, by
contrast, do not rely on an argument that the federal CSA is unconstitutional (although many proponents may well think that), and they
do not purport to affect the binding legal force of the federal prohibition. States like California and Colorado have “legalized” marijuana
only as a matter of state law. They are simply making a bet—and it
is a good one—that absent state cooperation, federal law is unlikely to
be enforced in their states. This is functional—not principled—nullification, but its effect on the ground is very close to what John C.
Calhoun’s South Carolina hoped to achieve.32
If state noncooperation undermines federal enforcement to this
degree, then one might think federal authorities would have a strong
argument that state marijuana laws are preempted. After all, surely
they “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”33 But the anticommandeering cases have established that states have no obligation to implement or enforce federal law unless they voluntarily agree to do so.34 It
follows that states have no obligation to criminalize conduct simply
because federal law does, and, in fact, there are any number of federal
offenses that are not mirrored under state law.35 Just as state marijuana laws do not formally question the validity of federal marijuana
See, e.g., H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times 439–
41 (2005); Howe, supra note 2, at 396–97.
31.

Lest one think that this resistance was confined to Southern
slaveholders, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a similar position that
it could judge for itself the unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act,
notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment that the act was
valid. See David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861, at
294–95 (1976) (noting that Wisconsin’s defiance “involved nullification
in a form that even John C. Calhoun had not advocated”). That did not
work out either. The U.S. Supremes rejected Wisconsin’s position in
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858), and “the Wisconsin
court, perceiving that it was a tactical error for antislavery men to support doctrines of state sovereignty, acquiesced in the decision.” Potter,
supra, at 295. The Ableman saga nonetheless makes clear that nullification could work against slavery as well as for it.

32.

Notably, the contemporary Tenth Amendment Center defines “nullification” as “[a]ny act or set of acts which renders a law null, void or just
unenforceable.” Tenth Amendment Center, http://tenthamendment
center.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).

33.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

34.

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).

35.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) (making it a crime to gather or deliver
defense information to aid a foreign government).
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regulation, I am unaware of any serious legal argument that states
may not decide not to criminalize marijuana possession (or any other
crime, for that matter) as a matter of state law.
The constitutional line between state interference with federal law
and state participation in federal enforcement was drawn long ago. In
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,36 the Court held that states could not intervene on behalf of putative escaped slaves by enacting personal liberty
laws that imposed procedural safeguards. But Justice Story’s majority
opinion also made clear that state officials could not be required to
participate in the capture or return of escapees 37 —a holding that
presaged the modern anticommandeering doctrine. A devoted abolitionist, Justice Story may have hoped that efforts to return escaped
slaves to their owners would fail without the ability to mandate
cooperation from state and local law enforcement.
Prigg’s denouement illustrates a critical weakness of modern-day
nullification. It turned out that the return of fugitive slaves was centrally important to national efforts to keep the Southern states in the
Union, and federal authorities were willing to devote significant federal resources to enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law without state cooperation.38 Moreover, many slave owners seem to have relied on selfhelp (such as Mr. Prigg himself, a private agent of the owner) to recapture their fugitives, so that state noncooperation afforded little
practical protection to blacks in the free states. There are, in other
words, only certain circumstances when a state’s decision not to participate in a federal regulatory regime will effectuate the state’s own
policy preferences.
I return to the prospects of modern-day nullification in Part III.
First, however, I consider what the phenomenon can tell us about the
dynamics of cooperative federalism.

II. State Sovereignty in the Age of
Cooperative Federalism
One of the most important developments in federalism scholarship
over the last decade has been a shift from old questions about the
boundary between state and federal regulatory authority to new
questions about the role of state governments and officials within
cooperative federalism schemes. The Supreme Court’s 1937 “switch in
time” largely marked the end of the “dual federalism” regime that had
36.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842).

37.

Id. at 615–16.

38.

See Potter, supra note 31, at 138–39 (concluding that the fugitive
slave laws were relatively effective even though the second Fugitive
Slave Act, enacted in 1850, “carefully avoided any attempt to employ
state officials in its enforcement”).
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dominated American law for its first century and a half;39 rather than
separate and exclusive spheres of state power, we now generally presume that Congress and the states exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over most subjects.40 Nowadays, the national and state governments
not only share the same potential regulatory jurisdiction—they also
frequently work together to implement federal programs.41 Although
federalism scholars concerned about the autonomy of the states long
viewed “cooperative federalism” as a euphemism for the absorption
and cooptation of states into the swirling vortex of federal power,42
scholars like Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have argued
that state participation in cooperative regimes offers new opportunities for states to assert “the power of the servant.”43
The scholarly literature on federalism is only just beginning to
explore the full implications of cooperative federalism for intergovernmental relations and the constitutional balance of power.44 The intergovernmental drama playing out in Colorado and Washington over
marijuana helps, I think, to illustrate some of the basic dynamics of
the cooperative model. Three things are becoming clear. First, federalism is becoming more like the horizontal separation of powers among
the branches of the national government, in the sense that the constitutional structure is no longer held in place by strict norms of separation but rather by a regime of interlocking checks and balances.
Second, state officials implementing federal law exercise power, but
they are not “servants.” In fact, the most essential aspect of state
sovereignty in the contemporary era may be the state political community’s right to select and hold to account its own officers—even
when they are acting within cooperative federalism schemes. And
third, intergovernmental conflict over marijuana illustrates the crucial
39.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the National Labor Relations
Act); see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,
36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950).

40.

See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual
Federalism, in Federalism and Subsidiarity 34, 66 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) [hereinafter Young, Puzzling
Persistence].

41.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

42.

See, e.g., Joseph F. Zimmerman, Contemporary American
Federalism: The Growth of National Power 1 (1992) (arguing
that the subordinate role of state officials within federal regulatory
schemes represents a “concentration of political powers in the national
government . . . .”).

43.

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1265.

44.

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative
Federalists, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 427 (2013) (sketching directions for future research) [hereinafter Young, Uncooperative Federalists].
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differences between preemption of state law and commandeering of
state officials. Even where Congress’s power to preempt remains
broad, constitutional limits on preemption afford states crucial intergovernmental leverage.
A.

Separation vs. Checks and Balances

Discussions of federalism in this country have, throughout our
history, typically focused on jurisdictional boundaries. For the first
century and a half, the “dual federalism” regime posited separate and
exclusive spheres of state and local authority; after 1937, legislative
jurisdiction is generally concurrent (with minor exceptions falling outside Congress’s broad commerce authority45). Those scholars who have
grappled with the dynamics of federalism in a concurrent regime have
typically focused on the interplay of political forces that may protect
state autonomy,46 the security afforded to states by the procedural
difficulty of making federal law, 47 or the potential of doctrines of
statutory construction to ease the threat that federal preemption
poses to state autonomy.48
This is all valuable work, but the marijuana situation calls
attention to another structural dynamic more familiar to horizontal
separation of powers analysis than to federalism: institutional checks
and balances. One suspects that it is the sour taste of nineteenthcentury nullification (and the secession that followed shortly afterward) that has made us reluctant to consider the possibility that
states might actually check federal government. But regardless of the
reason, modern courts and commentators have tended to interpret the
Supremacy Clause as strictly forbidding this sort of thing. As my
friend Heather Gerken recently observed, American law has “licens[ed]
opposition” primarily through “a rights-based strategy, not an institu-

45.

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was beyond the scope of Congress’s
commerce authority).

46.

See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); see also Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 219 (2000).

47.

See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).

48.

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 253, 288–92 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Ordinary Diet]; Garrick B.
Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (2010).
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tional one.”49 We have lost the sense of federalism facilitating a “loyal
opposition.”50
We do find institutional notions of loyal opposition in separation
of powers law. Although we all get frustrated with gridlock in Washington, D.C., most of us have calmer moments when we remember
James Madison’s notion in Federalist 51 that the conflicting interests
and efforts of officials in the various branches of government are what
keeps the system in rough balance. 51 Opposition, in the Founders’
vision, is a key component of the political structure—and that was
emphatically true of federalism as well as separation of powers.52
What may be less readily remembered is that the American doctrine of checks and balances is a creature of overlapping and concurrent authority, not jurisdictional separation. The draft constitution
was, in fact, criticized for not adhering to Montesquieu’s ideal that
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be kept strictly
separate and exercised by different institutions.53 Madison rebutted
this criticism by insisting that such jurisdictional boundaries were but
“parchment barriers,” which could not actually preserve the independence, much less the separation, of the branches in practice.54 In
place of jurisdictional separation, he urged a theory of checks and
balances predicated on jurisdictional overlap. “[T]he great security
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department,” he wrote, “consists in giving to those who administer
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”55 He thus embraced the
fact that “[t]he several departments of power are distributed and
blended,” citing as precedents the overlap of powers among the
branches in the British and the various state constitutions.56 Juris49.

Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1959
(2014).

50.

Id.

51.

See The Federalist No. 51, at 318–20 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).

52.

See, e.g., The Federalist No. 46, at 299–302 (James Madison) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (extolling the efficacy of state opposition to
national ambitions).

53.

See The Federalist No. 47, at 302–03 (James Madison) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (“One of the principal objections inculcated by the
more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments ought to be separate and distinct.”).

54.

The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).

55.

The Federalist No. 51, supra note 51, at 319.

56.

The Federalist No. 47, supra note 53, at 303–08.
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dictional and functional overlap rendered each branch dependent on
the other, because none could act alone.
Horizontal separation of powers thus offers neglected lessons for
the preservation of the federal balance in an age of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction. As Colorado and Washington are demonstrating,
their ability to oppose federal policy—and get away with it, to a
considerable extent—arises from the blending of federal and state institutions within cooperative federalism schemes. The federal government depends on state cooperation to enforce national law, and that
dependence is what empowers state officials to dissent. As I discuss in
Part III, this power of opposition may not extend far enough for
dissenting states to establish and secure their own policies, but they
can at least force a national conversation and some sort of compromise on the issues they care about.
B.

Of Servants and Sovereigns

Modern-day nullification trades on the leverage that cooperative
federalism schemes give state officials, but it also demonstrates that
the “servant” metaphor can mislead about the actual dynamics of
these relationships. I thus offer a friendly amendment to the notion of
“uncooperative federalism” emphasizing that state officials’ capacity
and motivation for resistance to federal policy stems largely from the
fact that they are agents of a different principal.
Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s theory argues that “power
also resides with states when they play the role of federal servants.”57
This power stems from several sources. These include the “dependence” of the federal government on state officials to administer federal programs, which gives state officials both “leverage” and “discretion in choosing how to accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to
prioritize.”58 State officials also derive power from their “integration”
into federal regulatory schemes; “[w]hen an actor is embedded in a
larger system,” Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue, “a web of connective tissues binds higher- and lower-level decisionmakers. Regular interactions generate trust and give lower-level decisionmakers the
knowledge and relationships they need to work the system.”59 Finally,
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken note that state officials “serve two
masters” in the sense that although they are implementing federal

57.

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1265.

58.

Id. at 1266; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994) (observing that in a cooperative
system, “[t]he federal government needs the states as much as the
reverse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in
the process”).

59.

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1268–69.
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policy, “their constituencies are based within the state.”60 This gives
state officials both the incentive and the power to challenge federal
officials, because they are not beholden to federal officials for their
positions and have alternative sources of resources.61
The last of these factors partially acknowledges—but inadequately
stresses—what I take to be the critical ingredient of uncooperative
federalism, which is that state officials do not work for the federal
government. The truth is, state officials are not servants—or at least
not servants of the national government. The federal government did
not hire these officials, nor can they fire them—no matter how
“uncooperative” they may be. They work for, and are accountable to,
the people of the state. It may be that state officials are sometimes
coopted into federal regulatory programs and come to internalize the
goals of the federal regulators who oversee their work; in some cases,
this phenomenon might even trump state officials’ loyalties to their
superiors in state government and to the citizens of their states.
Whether and to what extent this occurs is an interesting empirical
question worthy of further investigation. But a vast range of literature
in political science rests on the assumption that government officials
wish to retain their jobs, and that those officials are thus responsive
to those who have the power to fire them or vote them out of office.62
By that measure, state officials serve one master, not two, and that
master is their state.
Modern-day nullification, as illustrated by the marijuana saga,
vividly illustrates the independence of state officials. It is the limiting
case of uncooperative federalism—an entire refusal to participate in a
federal regulatory scheme that is contrary to state policy. And it is
driven by the fact that although the once-distinct spheres of state and
federal regulatory authority are now understood to overlap,63 federal
and state officials continue to confront largely separate chains of
electoral and administrative accountability. They are agents of
separate principals. And while the national government has powerful
leverage (especially financial inducements under the Spending Power)
to induce state cooperation, the anticommandeering doctrine ensures
that the choice remains with state governments and, ultimately, the
state electorate.64 If a state legislature is willing to sacrifice federal
60.

Id. at 1270.

61.

Id. at 1270–71.

62.

Likewise, much separation of powers jurisprudence assumes that the
power to control an executive official is synonymous with the power to
remove him. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010).

63.

See, e.g., Young, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 40, at 34–35.

64.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(striking down the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion on the
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funding and other inducements in order to opt out of a federal
regulatory program, state officials have little choice but to walk away.
This, in turn, suggests that certain aspects of state sovereignty
and certain forms of federal intervention ought to be particularly
sensitive from an uncooperative federalism perspective. A state’s
control over its own officials—whether it takes the form of elections,
executive control, or accountability to the legislature—is crucial. And
any federal intervention that threatens to dilute that control ought to
be particularly suspect. For example, the Supreme Court’s characterization of the Voting Rights Act as a unique threat to state sovereignty because it amounted to federal intervention into the process by
which a state chooses its representatives and officials65 makes a great
deal of sense from this perspective. And the anticommandeering
doctrine—which Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken think may
undermine uncooperative federalism66—is actually critically important
to its efficacy because that doctrine ensures that state officials remain
beholden only to their state principals.67
Much work remains to be done to flesh out the theory of
uncooperative federalism and verify its empirical claims.68 Examples
where states decline to participate in cooperative federalism arrangements—like California’s, Colorado’s, and other states’ dissent from
federal marijuana policy—may well provide insight into more nuanced
resistance and less spectacular instances of resistance within other
federal regulatory schemes.

III. Nullification’s Prospects
The jury is still out on whether modern-day nullification will meet
a similar fate to its nineteenth century counterpart. As the preceding
ground that it coerced state governments into administering a federal
program).
65.

See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (observing that “States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments” and that “‘[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen’” (quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161
(1892))).

66.

See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1297 (“A strong
proponent of uncooperative federalism would embrace commandeering
not because it increases national power or furthers federal-state cooperation, as most proponents of commandeering would have it, but because
it facilitates challenges to federal policy.”).

67.

See also Young, Uncooperative Federalists, supra note 44, at 440–42
(2013) (criticizing Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s criticism of the anticommandeering doctrine).

68.

See id. at 434–52.
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discussion suggests, the key to modern-day nullification lies in
charting the boundary between valid preemption of state law and
invalid commandeering of state governments. I thus begin this last
section with an assessment of arguments that federal law preempts
Colorado’s marijuana legalization regime—including an extraordinary
recent lawsuit filed in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
by the neighboring states of Nebraska and Oklahoma. I then consider
the more general prospects for modern-day nullification as a form of
resisting federal encroachments on state autonomy.
A.

Federal Preemption of State Marijuana Laws

In December 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma moved for permission
to file a lawsuit against the state of Colorado in the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, arguing that federal law preempts
Colorado’s marijuana legalization regime.69 The complaint argues that
“a state may not establish its own policy that is directly counter to
federal policy against trafficking in controlled substances or establish
a state-sanctioned system for possession, production, licensing, and
distribution of drugs in a manner which interferes with the federal
drug laws.”70 This statement nicely frames the two crucial aspects of
the marijuana preemption debate. The first—the claim that “a state
may not establish its own policy that is directly counter to federal
policy”71—is rather plainly wrong. But the second—that a state may
not establish “a state-sanctioned system . . . which interferes with
the federal drug laws” 72 —has considerable validity. That principle
forbidding interference with federal law states the outer limit of
modern-day nullification, and it suggests that while nullification may
be an effective means of forcing a political dialogue on a given policy
question, it cannot itself provide an effective basis for stable state
governance.
Begin with the assertion that “a state may not establish its own
policy that is directly counter to federal policy.” 73 That has been
untrue ever since the early Republic. When Congress enacted the

69.

Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support,
States of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado, No. 220144
(filed Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter NE & OK Complaint]; see also Lyle
Denniston, Two States Sue to Block Colorado Marijuana Markets,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 8:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2014/12/two-states-sue-to-block-colorado-marijuana-markets/.

70.

NE & OK Complaint, supra note 69, at 2 (emphasis omitted).

71.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798,74 Virginia and Kentucky not only
pursued a contrary policy of not persecuting aliens and dissenters but
vigorously (and officially) protested and worked to undermine
Congress’s policy.75 Abolitionist states could not interfere with federal
laws favoring slaveholders, but they certainly pursued a contrary
policy by outlawing slavery within their own territory and forbidding
their officials to cooperate with the federal Fugitive Slave law. More
recently, several states recognized same-sex marriage even though it
was the avowed policy of the national government to recognize
marriages only between a man and a woman. 76 Even before the
Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act on equal
protection grounds, 77 no one thought that state same-sex marriage
laws were preempted simply because the national government had
pursued a different policy.
To take the simplest illustration, imagine that Colorado chose to
leave marijuana completely unregulated and have no laws on the
subject at all. It is hard to imagine a state policy that is more
“directly counter to federal policy” than that. And yet the Supremacy
Clause certainly does not require states to enact laws that mirror
federal regulation; as New York v. United States78 held, the anticommandeering doctrine forbids Congress to demand that sort of action.79
There are two relevant differences between this example and the
actual state of affairs. The first is that Colorado once did prohibit
marijuana use; hence, it took an action to repeal significant parts of
that prohibition rather than simply declining to regulate in the first
place. That cannot make the constitutional difference, however. The
Supremacy Clause has never been interpreted to “lock in” state
policies that the state cannot be required to enact in the first instance.80
The second difference is that Colorado has done more than decline
to regulate marijuana; rather, it has put in place a state regulatory
regime that arguably supports and encourages a line of business that
74.

Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act, ch. 58,
1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566
(1798), repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153, 155.

75.

See, e.g., Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy:
Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 Const.
Comment. 315, 316 (1994).

76.

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).

77.

See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).

78.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

79.

Id. at 159–66.

80.

For one thing, that sort of policy lock-in would induce states to think
twice before enacting legislation in support of federal policy.
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still violates federal law.81 This leads to the second aspect of Nebraska
and Oklahoma’s preemption claim—that is, that Colorado’s
regulatory regime actually interferes with the federal policy
prohibiting marijuana production, distribution, and use. This claim
does, in my view, raise a plausible preemption argument.
Colorado has not simply decided not to prohibit marijuana use.
Rather, it has established a regulatory regime predicated on the
legality of some marijuana consumption—notwithstanding the continuing prohibition of marijuana cultivation, distribution, and consumption under federal law. Robert Mikos has identified three classes of
state laws that raise plausible claims of interference with federal
policy. The first class “regulates the supply of marijuana. This body
includes regulations that require suppliers to obtain a license from the
state, laws that dictate how suppliers operate (e.g., zoning), laws that
tax the sale of marijuana, and so on.” 82 A second class regulates
marijuana consumption—particularly in those states permitting only
medical uses. For example, this class “includes laws that stipulate the
steps patients must take to establish eligibility for the medical
marijuana defense and laws that limit the consumption behavior of
marijuana users.”83 Finally, “[a] third category of laws arguably promotes marijuana-related activities.”84 These laws may protect marijuana users from discrimination or provide public benefits to
marijuana users; some proposals would go even further and involve
the state in the cultivation or distribution of the drug.85
All of these laws arguably encourage behavior that remains a
violation of federal law. Licensing suppliers or medicinal users to
distribute or consume marijuana is, literally, licensing a violation of
the Controlled Substances Act. The states have a good answer to this
argument, however, which ought to preclude preemption of mere
licensing laws. State laws on marijuana are currently in a state of
flux, and those states that have legalized (or decriminalized) the drug
have done so only partially, for certain persons or in certain quantities
or circumstances. Citizens have a right under the Due Process Clause
to fair notice as to when the state will prosecute them and when it
will not.86 From this perspective, a state “license” is merely an official
81.

See John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding:
A Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 649 (2015).

82.

Mikos, Preemption, supra note 6, at 31.

83.

Id.

84.

Id. at 32.

85.

Id. at 32–36.

86.

See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (“‘No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
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statement from the state that a person’s behavior falls within the
zone that is immune from prosecution under state law. It is not at all
clear that Congress could constitutionally enact a statute preventing
the states from giving clear notice of what acts are crimes under state
law—and even less clear that Congress intended to do so in the
Controlled Substances Act.
Other aspects of the state regulatory scheme, however, cannot
readily be characterized as efforts to give fair notice. Certainly
proposals to have the state cultivate marijuana in order to safeguard
its quality are preempted (and could well lead to actual federal
prosecution of state officials). Laws that prohibit private individuals
from discriminating against marijuana users effectively seek to remove
the stigma and private consequences ordinarily attendant upon
violations of federal law. To the extent that all laws depend on social
norms as well as public enforcement for their effectiveness, such
efforts to undermine those norms would stand as an obstacle to the
purposes of federal law.
Nonetheless, the mere legalization of marijuana use—apart from
efforts to regulate it just discussed—should pass a preemption
challenge. The CSA does not expressly preempt such legalization in
that it does not purport to require states to enact parallel prohibitions, and if it did, it would raise serious anticommandeering problems.87 And its antipreemption clause disavows any intent to “occupy
the field” of marijuana regulation.88 That leaves conflict preemption,
which comes in two flavors: “impossibility” preemption,89 and “purposes and objectives” or “obstacle” preemption.90
Impossibility preemption is unlikely. As Professor Mikos points
out, “[a] citizen can obey a state law allowing or even authorizing the
possession, distribution, or cultivation of marijuana and the CSA’s
express ban on these same activities by not engaging in them.” 91
Brannon Denning’s contribution to this Symposium thinks this
answer “carr[ies] verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land
the State commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939))).
87.

See also Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1451 (“Notably,
the CSA does not proscribe omissions; that is, it does not impose any
duty to act . . . such as a duty to report known violations.”).

88.

21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).

89.

See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963) (noting that state law is preempted “where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).

90.

See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that preemption occurs when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).

91.

Mikos, Preemption, supra note 6, at 27–28.
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of the sophists.” 92 But impossibility preemption is supposed to be
extremely narrow. The broadest expansion of the impossibility
category occurred in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,93 which held that a
generic drug manufacturer could not comply with both a state tort
duty requiring it to change its warning label and a federal regulatory
regime that required FDA approval to do so. “The question for
‘impossibility,’” Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, “is whether
the private party could independently do under federal law what state
law requires of it.”94 Here, state law requires nothing of individuals—
no one is making them grow, distribute, or consume marijuana. And
the impossibility notion does not run in the opposite direction, to
require preemption wherever state law allows what federal law prohibits. If it did, then the Supremacy Clause would require each state
to enact espionage statutes.
What about “obstacle” preemption? Professor Denning “find[s] it
self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting marijuana use
for medical or recreational purposes present a substantial obstacle to
the implementation of a federal law that (1) recognizes no medical use
for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the national market in marijuana by banning all production, possession, and transfer.”95 And the
Nebraska and Oklahoma Complaint claims that the federal CSA
regime will be “undercut unless the intrastate activity . . . were
regulated as well as the interstate and international activity.”96 That
may be so, but that fact cannot itself compel Colorado to regulate the
intrastate activity. Federal law can—and does—regulate intrastate
marijuana production, distribution, and consumption,97 and Colorado
may not affirmatively interfere with that regulatory effort. But the
92.

Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and
Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 567, 578 (2015) (quoting National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2656 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting)).

93.

131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011); see also Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note
48, at 288–92 (discussing PLIVA and the impossibility standard).

94.

Id. at 2579. “Independently” was the key point in PLIVA, because the
plaintiffs pointed out that the defendant drug manufacturer could have
applied for FDA approval to change the license as required by state law.
Impossibility should only exist, plaintiffs (and the Court’s dissenters)
said, if the defendant could show that federal approval would not have
been forthcoming. Id. at 2588–89 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

95.

Denning, supra note 92, at 580.

96.

NE & OK Complaint, supra note 69, at 6.

97.

The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate
activity where necessary to support its interstate regulatory efforts even
during the Lochner era. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United
States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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anticommandeering doctrine necessarily means that it cannot be
required to help without its consent.
Consider, for example, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,98 in which Pennsylvania’s “personal liberty law” required agents of slave owners to
satisfy a state court that the person they proposed to apprehend was,
in fact, a fugitive slave before exercising their rights under the federal
Fugitive Slave Act to return her to her owner. Justice Story’s
majority opinion held the liberty law preempted in what nowadays
would be a classic case of obstacle preemption: the state law threw up
significant barriers to the owner’s exercise of rights guaranteed under
federal law. But Story was also careful to say that state officials and
courts need not assist in the repatriation of allegedly escaped slaves.
Practically speaking, this was surely an obstacle too—given the
preponderance of state officials and the more ready availability of
state tribunals. Allowing the states to opt out of fugitive slave
enforcement would inevitably make that enforcement more difficult.
But this is the difference between preemption and commandeering:
“obstacles” posed by state officials’ decisions not to help enforce
federal law are not the sort of obstacles upon which preemption may
rest.
Even apart from preemption, however, the continuing federal
prohibition will make it extremely difficult for legalizing states to
establish a stable regime. Limited federal enforcement remains
possible in a variety of scenarios. Federal authorities may choose to
target marijuana businesses or commercial-scale growers. They may
use marijuana charges as a lever against persons targeted for some
other reasons (including arbitrary ones). The federal illegality of
marijuana businesses also has a host of collateral consequences:
marijuana businesses may be unable to access the banking world on
account of federal prohibitions on financial transactions involving
illegal activity;99 they may face damaging federal tax consequences;100
and state ethics rules may prevent attorneys from counseling persons
who engage in activities that remain illegal under federal law.101 Likewise, individuals using marijuana in violation of federal law may face
significant employment or family law consequences, and persons on
probation or parole may find that marijuana use constitutes a viola-

98.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see supra note 36 and accompanying text
(discussing Prigg).

99.

See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 597, 600 (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman,
Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 91–93 (2015).

100. See Chemerinsky, Forman, Hopper & Kamin, supra note 99, at 94.
101. See id. at 95–97.
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tion of that status.102 Finally, not everyone is Justice Holmes’s “bad
man”—that is, motivated only by the fear of sanctions. 103 Even if
adverse legal consequences are unlikely, some persons may have
strong moral or religious aversions to lawbreaking.104
States like Colorado and California thus have not succeeded—and
cannot succeed, on their own—in making either recreational or
medicinal use of marijuana legal, either as a formal or as a practical
matter. They have, instead, created a highly unstable situation that is
unlikely to satisfy proponents of either legalization or prohibition over
the long term. Legalization cannot achieve its goals—a safe, aboveboard, and well-regulated market for marijuana—in the teeth of a
continuing federal prohibition. But that prohibition will hardly be a
legitimate, nonarbitrary legal regime in the absence of state and local
enforcement partners. Something will have to give.
The remarkable thing for students of federalism is that a handful
of states have been able to force both a fundamental rethinking of national marijuana policy and to secure significant exemptions from
federal law—notwithstanding the clear mandate of the Supremacy
Clause that federal law trumps state policy. The inability to establish
a stable state regulatory regime for marijuana free of federal interference should not blind us to this fact. Destabilizing a federal policy
that had endured for many decades and opening a national conversation on the issue is a major accomplishment for this handful of dissenting states. It is, after all, just the sort of thing that a loyal
opposition is supposed to do.
B.

Other Applications?

It is difficult to say whether the effective nullification of national
marijuana laws in a significant and growing proportion of American
states is likely to become a more general feature of our federalism,
impacting a broader array of federal regulatory regimes. Modern-day
nullification seems unlikely to work outside a fairly narrow range of
legal and political circumstances. Within those bounds, however, it
may offer an attractive mechanism for harnessing the dynamism of
contemporary state governments in an era of federal gridlock. Moreover, it may also hold out some promise for defusing certain problems
vexing the separation of powers at the federal level.

102. See id. at 98–100.
103. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459
(1897).
104. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 55–56 (1972)
(suggesting that law binds from the “internal point of view”—that is,
voluntary compliance without regard to the practical threat of
sanctions).
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Marijuana-style nullification makes sense only with respect to
regulatory problems with a particular legal structure. A state’s
preferences must be more libertarian than the current state of law. If
the state wishes to regulate more strictly than the federal government,
then one of two things will be true. The first possibility is that federal
law will not preempt the state’s regulation—perhaps because federal
law sets a regulatory floor but not a ceiling105—in which case no resort
to exotic concepts is necessary; the state is free to supplement federal
regulation as it sees fit. The other is that federal law does preempt
state regulation. In that event, the state cannot rely on federal
resource constraints to permit it to regulate more broadly, because
individuals or businesses affected by the state regulation will be able
to raise a preemption defense in court when it is enforced against
them.
Modern-day nullification thus seems likely to be a viable tactic
only when a state prefers less regulation on a particular subject than
does the federal government. It is also unlikely to work where federal
regulation has direct beneficiaries who would be able to sue to compel
enforcement of federal law by the courts. Generally speaking, federal
standing doctrine is stingy about suits by the beneficiaries of regulation arguing that federal authorities are enforcing the law with
insufficient rigor.106 But Article III does not categorically prohibit such
suits either. Where permitted access to federal court, beneficiaries of
federal regulation may prove able to induce federal authorities to enforce federal law even where they might prefer to pursue other priorities.
Serious political constraints also exist. National public opinion on
marijuana places the federal Controlled Substances Act in a kind of
limbo. There is insufficient public demand for legalization to engender
a strong political movement for repeal or amendment, but there is
also insufficient support for prosecuting marijuana users to prompt
federal authorities to allocate increased resources that might compensate for state noncooperation. It may be that there are other federal
crimes that arouse similarly ambivalent public attitudes—sports
betting is one possibility. But it is hard to think of many other
obvious examples.
Under the right conditions, however, modern-day nullification
may well be an attractive mechanism for promoting government
innovation. The federal government, not to put too fine a point on it,
105. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1558
(2007).
106. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753–55 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black children in public schools who argued that the
IRS was inadequately enforcing rules and that segregated private schools
cannot claim tax-exempt status).
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has been largely dysfunctional for the better part of the last two-anda-half presidential administrations. The “mess in Washington” has not
only torpedoed the approval ratings of presidents and the Congress; it
has also contributed to a significant and persistent decline in public
trust for federal governmental institutions. 107 As Robert Mikos has
pointed out, the trust disadvantage that the federal government now
suffers vis-à-vis state and local governments is one reason that
modern-day nullification can be successful.108 When state governments
are more trusted than the Feds, state judgments about, say, the
appropriateness of marijuana use more readily displace the moral
suasion of federal law.
State governments are not only more trusted; they are also
frequently more able to act on matters of current social concern. That
is because, unlike the national government, a significant number of
states have unitary governments—that is, the same party controls the
governorship and both houses of the state legislature.109 Nonetheless,
where federal statutes like the CSA’s marijuana prohibition are
already in place, gridlock at the federal level may prevent efforts to
facilitate state policy innovation. Federalism scholars (including this
one) have often cited the difficulty of enacting federal law as a

107. See, e.g., Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care about
Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 589,
598 (2007) (“Citizens on average evaluate the performance of the federal
government as significantly lower than that of the state and local
governments, report less faith in the federal government to ‘do the right
thing,’ have significantly lower confidence in the ability of the federal
government to solve problems effectively, see the federal government as
significantly less responsive than lower levels of government, and nearly
60 percent see the federal government as the most corrupt level of government.”); see also Pew Research Ctr., State Governments
Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low 1 (2013)
(showing the results of a 2013 survey where only 28% of the public rated
the federal government favorably); Megan Mullin, Federalism, in
Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy 209, 216–19
(Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (showing
that the results of public surveys indicated a decline in public trust of
the federal government); Marc J. Hetherington & John D. Nugent,
Explaining Public Support for Devolution: The Role of Political Trust,
in What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike? 134,
137–38 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (summarizing surveys that showed that “on average, state governments were
perceived in an increasingly positive light at about the same time that
people were losing faith in the federal government”).
108. See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1471.
109. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Red, Blue States Move in Opposite Directions in a
New Era of Single-Party Control, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2013, at A1
(“[T]oday, three-quarters of the states . . . are controlled by either
Republicans or Democrats.”).
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safeguard of state autonomy.110 Carlos Vazquez has pointed out, however, that “[r]ather than protect state interests, [the difficulty of
enacting federal law] privileges the legal status quo—whether that
status quo be state law or federal.”111 Hence, the federal legislative
gauntlet “sometimes hinders the devolution of legislative power to the
states.”112 Modern-day nullification may break this sort of impasse,
returning us to a federalist solution in which individual states can
effectively legalize or criminalize a particular activity by choosing
whether to cooperate with federal enforcement.
State divergence from federal enforcement priorities may also help
untangle one of the intractable separation of powers puzzles in contemporary law—that is, how to curb the national executive’s
discretion not to enforce, and sometimes not to defend in court,
particular federal statutes. Most agree that prosecutorial discretion is
a valuable safeguard that allows the executive to do a more nuanced
form of justice in particular cases; most would likewise acknowledge
that the executive ought not to have its own nullification power by
declining to enforce laws with which it disagrees. And yet, partly
because drawing the proper boundary is so difficult, there are
virtually no institutional checks on the Executive’s enforcement
discretion. One possibility would be for states to harness potential
disagreement between the President and the states by authorizing
states to enforce federal law where the President refuses to do so.
Justice Scalia suggested in Printz that this sort of circumvention
of the national executive is unconstitutional under the unitary
executive principle.113 That argument, however, proves too much—it
suggests that not only commandeering but all cooperative federalism
arrangements (as well as enforcement of federal law by private
attorneys general) must be unconstitutional. More recently, in
Arizona v. United States,114 the Court treated the question whether
Arizona could enforce federal immigration laws more aggressively
than the President had chosen to do as a pure question of
congressional intent. Although the Court found preemption in that
case, the Court’s analysis strongly implied that if Congress chose to
authorize state enforcement that went further than the Executive
wished, there would be no constitutional impediment to doing so.

110. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 47, at 1339–40.
111. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Nationalism, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1601, 1603 (2008).
112. Id.
113. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997).
114. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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Conclusion
Nullification is dead. South Carolina lost the constitutional debate
over resistance to the State, and the South lost the Civil War. And
yet, state resistance to federal authority persists. California, Colorado,
and other states have demonstrated that, at least in some circumstances, states can establish a legal regime contrary to federal law
simply because the national government lacks the resources and political will to enforce its rules without state cooperation.
This contemporary form of nullification can tell us some important things about federalism. It suggests, for instance, that the most
important zone of state autonomy is a state’s control over its own
officials. Even when spheres of regulatory jurisdiction overlap, the fact
that state officials do not work for federal authorities affords the
states important opportunities to influence—and sometimes defy—the
enforcement of federal law. California’s and Colorado’s example may
also offer an attractive way to mitigate national gridlock and, perhaps, to ease otherwise intractable separation of powers tensions
arising from the national Executive’s enforcement discretion.
Long live nullification.
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